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ABSTRACT
This article studies the epidemic of kidnappings across six countries
between 1968 and 1990. The goal is to identify those factors that
determine the operational decisions made by terrorists. Why and how
do terrorists decide to engage in certain types of actions but not
others? The article discusses a number of scholarly approaches, and
the variables these studies have put forward to explain the decision-
making processes within terrorist organizations. The argument made
here is that the groups’ ideological preferences, strategic analysis, and
need to attract media attention did not appear to exert much
inﬂuence in the terrorists’ decision to kidnap. Organizational resources
and the nature of the security environment in which the terrorists
operated had some bearing. However, kidnappings became attractive
when terrorists made a pragmatic evaluation of the reaction by
governments and the public and consequently of the costs or beneﬁts
of a particular course of action. The decision to carry out a campaign of
kidnappings, or to abstain from kidnapping, should be interpreted as
clear evidence of terrorist learning. Two types of learning appear to
have inﬂuenced the adoption of kidnappings: learning by observing
others and learning by doing.
In December 1973, the Basque Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty, or ETA)
assassinated the Spanish prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. This was a spectacular
feat that eliminated any possibility of a continuation of Francoism after General Francisco
Franco’s death, greatly eased the advent of democracy, and therefore colored the Spaniards’
views on ETA for a decade. ETA was quite candid in its book-length account of this operation:
ETA was given a secret news report that in Madrid Luis Carrero Blanco went to mass every
morning at 9 in a Jesuit church on Serrano Street… it appeared that there wasn’t much guard-
ing of Carrero. It might even be possible to kidnap him. That’s the real way the idea of kidnap-
ping Carrero came about. It would have been more logical for us to have planned to kidnap
Carrero and then ﬁnd the means of doing it. But life is always a little topsy-turvy, and in this
case, we did it backwards.1
Without that tip on Carrero’s church attendance, which ETA obtained by chance, the
operation might not have been conceived. Surveillance convinced ETA that the kidnapping
CONTACT Maria Rasmussen mrasmussen@nps.edu Department of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943, USA.
This article not subject to US copyright law.
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237226
would be easy, as the Admiral never varied his routine, only had a couple of bodyguards, and
always followed the same route to the church and then to work. However, in June 1973
Carrero was appointed prime minister, his security was upgraded, and his church attendance
became less regular. He was still taking the same route to and from church. So ETA changed
the plan from a kidnapping to an assassination.2 The group was lucky to ﬁnd a basement ﬂat
for rent overlooking the admiral’s route. ETA dug a tunnel from the ﬂat to the middle of the
street, placed a bomb there, and killed the prime minister as he drove away after mass.
ETA went on to practice the art of kidnapping assiduously after Carrero. However, Irish
terrorists, who shared with the Basques a common ideology, secessionist goals, socioeco-
nomic base of recruitment, and organizational structure, did not. The same can be observed
if one compares the campaigns of violence in Germany and Italy: Italian terrorists consis-
tently carried out kidnappings, and the Germans did not, in spite of the fact that during this
period the resort to kidnappings worldwide was frequently described as an “epidemic.” This
article investigates why.
The next section discusses a number of scholarly approaches, and the variables these stud-
ies have put forward to explain the decision-making processes within terrorist organizations.
I then provide my own explanation, emphasizing a more immediate, pragmatic, short-term
analysis by the terrorists of the advantages and disadvantages of engaging in particular tac-
tics. The article then analyses the spread of kidnappings across six different countries
between 1968 and 1990. Following Brian Jackson, I argue that the decision to carry out a
campaign of kidnappings, or to abstain from kidnapping, should be interpreted as clear evi-
dence of terrorist learning.3
Explaining the Adoption of Kidnappings
What factors determine the operational decisions made by terrorists at any given time? Why
and how do terrorists decide to engage in certain types of actions but not others? Some
scholars have viewed these puzzles as a terrorist targeting question, or as one of choices
from within a repertoire of actions.4 Others talk about the logic of terrorism.5 Following the
September 2001 attacks, many turned their attention to innovation in terrorism—the ques-
tion of why terrorists decide to do something they have not done before.6 Finally, scholars
have discussed why terrorists decide to emulate what other terrorists have done. Evaluating
and applying this last body of literature is somewhat problematic because the terms are con-
tested. Some scholars use the terms “contagion” and “diffusion” interchangeably, and as
mere synonyms of other terms such as “emulation,” “mimicry,” or “fad.”7 Others differenti-
ate between “contagion,” viewed as conscious, direct imitation among units that are con-
nected and “diffusion,” meant to describe a random occurrence of events among
independent units of analysis.8
What these authors and perspectives have in common is that they have identiﬁed a set
of variables that helps explain the problem at hand. The output of terrorism, that is to say
the operations, is primarily interpreted as the result of the group’s ideological preferences
and/or strategic analysis.9 A second argument is that operational decisions may be driven
by the need to attract the attention of the media and ultimately to recruit and/or obtain
support.10 Finally, there is the argument that the terrorist repertoire will be inﬂuenced by
organizational resources (size, money, structure), competition with other groups, and/or by
the nature of the security environment in which the group operates.11
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Ideology is a very poor predictor of terrorist behavior. If terrorist ideology consistently
informed terrorist action, there should have been some congruence in the types of victims
sought by the Italian Red Brigades and the German Red Army Fraction (RAF), given that
these are both Marxist organizations but, as C. J. M. Drake’s study of target selection shows,
there is not.12 If ideology were an important factor guiding operations, we would not witness
the fact that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was responsible for such a large proportion of
Catholic civilian fatalities in Ireland after 1969, or that Muslim terrorists are largely responsi-
ble for the killing of other Muslims in the last decade.
We should also discount the notion that terrorist violence “resulted from an overall politi-
cal strategy designed in the light of domestic contextual circumstances.”13 The implication is
that the correct strategy will lead to victory, while in reality terrorism seldom wins. In addi-
tion, as J. Bowyer Bell once famously quipped,
Very few revolutionary organizations invest much time in strategic planning or organizational
analysis. There may be an investment in ideology or internal propaganda under various guises,
but the compelling concerns of the anti-insurgency experts are not found in the underground.
Any day-long analytical conference focuses deeper and longer on rebel strategy and tactics than
do rebels over a year. There is little time for contemplation during an armed struggle and that is
spent on the faith, survival and operations.14
The notion that ideology or strategic analysis will guide terrorist action can be rejected for
a number of reasons. The distribution of beliefs among members of a group is always
uneven. The work of Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny, who interviewed Pal-
estinian terrorists in Israeli jails, is instructive. Confronted by concrete questions about strat-
egy and tactical options, the terrorists provided very different answers grounded not in
ideology or religious belief but in personal preferences and/or their immediate life circum-
stances. More important, these men provided very different answers, even though they all
belonged to the same terrorist group.15 In addition, anybody who has interviewed terrorists
knows that their grasp of ideology is faulty at best. In fact, terrorists tend to denigrate ideol-
ogy—as the Uruguayan Tupamaros said, “words divide us, action unites us.”16 The case of
Mohammed Nahin Ahmed and Yusuf Zubair Sarwar, who purchased Islam for Dummies
and The Koran for Dummies once they had decided to ﬁght in Syria, suggests that on occa-
sion ideological justiﬁcations are post facto.17 ETA’s account of how they came to murder
their own prime minister was a frank admission of the role of pragmatism and chance in ter-
rorist planning. We also know from a variety of studies of terrorist life histories, from
Donatella della Porta’s groundbreaking edited volume to Marc Sageman’s study of global
Salaﬁ jihadists, that terrorist behavior is better explained by recourse to group psychology.
Friendship and kinship ties, revenge, and survivor guilt are all variables that explain terrorist
behavior much better than ideology does.18 Finally, Martha Crenshaw taught us that organi-
zational dynamics play a huge role in the development of terrorist behavior.19
The perennial terrorist desire for publicity is another factor that can be discounted as an
explanation for the mimicry of particular tactics. The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed a wealth
of articles and books about the relationship between the media and terrorism. The bulk of the
writing was done in the 1980s, and comparatively little was published after 1992–94. Much of
this writing was heavily inﬂuenced by two events, the 1979 Iran hostage crisis and the hijack-
ing of TWA ﬂight 847 to Beirut in 1985. Writings on the media and terrorism tend toward
over-generalizations about the behavior and expectations of terrorists. Comparatively few
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studies involve careful analysis of actual media coverage. In addition, few studies emphasize
key differences between print and electronic media, and between the evening news and docu-
mentaries, though the focus now is almost exclusively on the Internet. In any event, the CNN
factor, as well as the commercialization of news divisions in the United States that has been
described as “news as public drama”20 means that all terrorism will receive blanket coverage.
This still does not explain why some operations are undertaken and others are not.
If ideology, strategic analysis, and the desire for media coverage do not help explain the
adoption of kidnappings, what does? The argument made here is that organizational resour-
ces and the nature of the security environment have some bearing. However, kidnappings
become attractive when a terrorist organization perceives that the tactic is efﬁcacious in
achieving desired aims in the short term. As has been remarked, “behaviour is more likely to
be imitated if it is seen to be rewarded.”21 Who provides those rewards? Governments and
the public. The reaction by governments and civil society will determine whether a group
adopts a given tactic as part of its repertoire.
When he discusses insurgent kidnappings, Jon Elster distinguishes between the govern-
ment’s response to a kidnapping and the government’s response to the practice of kidnap-
pings.22 This is an important distinction and applicable to all terrorist tactics. Target
hardening and/or the adoption of speciﬁc countermeasures may decrease the overall appeal
of a given tactic. An example is that of the drop in hijackings after metal detectors were
introduced. On the other hand, the belief that the government has suffered a decisive blow
(in prestige, capabilities, legitimacy) after an individual attack may indicate to the terrorists
that the tactic is worth pursuing. This may happen even if the terrorist group needs to
expend signiﬁcant resources in pursuit of a given tactic. As David Kilcullen has recently
argued, “guerrillas and terrorists can gain strategic advantage just by demonstrating skill,
daring, and tactical competence: the ‘style points’ they acquire, and the shock value of show-
ing they’re a force to be reckoned with, can outweigh tactical failures.”23
As far as civil society is concerned, there is a widespread belief in academic and policy
circles that loss of support from the terrorists’ own constituency will have the effect of decreas-
ing the appeal of a tactic, while an increase in popular support might indicate that the action is
worth pursuing. There is some evidence to back this up—witness the Palestinian civilians’ sup-
port for suicide terrorism in spite of the terrible price they have paid in the form of Israeli retal-
iation. However, the relationship between public support for terrorism and terrorist operations
is more nuanced. If the group is ﬂush with funds and recruits, it does not need societal support.
In addition, Christopher Hewitt carried out some work on public opinion views on terrorism
in ﬁve countries that demonstrated that civil society’s approval of terrorism is fairly inelastic,
to use economic jargon.24 But the acceptance by civil society does impact the group’s ability to
operate in direct and indirect ways. Mao’s metaphor about ﬁsh and water was indeed apt.
Testing the Argument
A kidnapping is deﬁned here as the illegal seizure of an individual who will be held in secret
locations, frequently until demands have been met. Not discussed here are barricade and
hostage incidents, in which individuals are seized but kept in a public location, or hijackings,
in which a large number of individuals are seized in a very public manner in addition to an
aircraft or ship.25 The essential characteristic of a kidnapping lies in the fact that the victim
and perpetrators are in hiding for a certain period of time, and that the resolution of the
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incident will quite likely (but not always) happen outside the public eye. The modern era of
kidnappings started in Latin America in the late sixties, spread to Europe in the seventies,
and to the Middle East in the eighties. This period is widely considered the heyday of kid-
nappings, which declined precipitously in the nineties, but became important once again in
the new millennium, this time in South Asia.26
Although it is customary in the ﬁeld of terrorism studies to decry the absence of consen-
sus on deﬁnitions and typologies, most take as an article of faith the distinction expertly
drawn by Peter Waldmann between ethnic and sociorevolutionary terrorism.27 Ethnic terro-
rists recognize themselves as members of a given community that they purport to defend
from outside attack. Mobilization in this case emerges out of membership in a collective. By
contrast, sociorevolutionary terrorists are mobilized by an ideology into defense of a group
(frequently, the proletariat) to which they do not belong. Therefore, this section will com-
pare the spread of kidnappings in Spain and Ireland, both cases of ethnic terrorism, Italy
and Germany, and Argentina and Uruguay, all cases of sociorevolutionary terrorism. The
period to be considered is 1968–1990. In all six countries, terrorist campaigns were launched
in 1968–70. By 1990, terrorist groups in Argentina, Uruguay, and Italy had been defeated.
Although terrorist groups in Ireland, Spain, and Germany remained active after 1990, only
ETA continued kidnapping. Between 1991 and its dissolution in 2011, the group carried out
an additional ﬁve kidnappings. As Table 1 suggests, the two most widely used databases on
terrorism incidents are incomplete when it comes to kidnappings.
Table 1 compares the total number of kidnappings in the RAND and START data-
bases for the six countries under consideration with the ﬁgures collated for this article.
Until 1998 the RAND database only recorded incidents of international terrorism, where
the perpetrators and victims came from at least two different countries. START inherited
the data collected by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, which included domestic
incidents but relied on open sources, mostly in English. This might have produced a bias
toward international incidents.28 We know that in any given context incidents classiﬁed
as international terrorism are a fraction of the total volume of violence witnessed. Focus-
ing on international incidents alone would distort the picture. The START data on Ire-
land are also deceptive because in 32 out of 34 instances recorded, the victim was seized
only to be almost immediately killed. START counts these as kidnappings, but the most
authoritative account of all deaths in the Irish conﬂict does not.29 It therefore became
necessary to build a database of kidnappings for the six countries concerned. The results
are presented in Table 2.
Table 1. A comparison of kidnapping incidents across three databases, 1968–1990.
RAND! GTD!! Current study!!!
Spain 61 81
Ireland 2 34 7
Uruguay 2 10 15
Argentina 4 26 239
Italy 4 13 26
Germany 2 4
Total 14 144 372
Sources.!“Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents 1968–2009,” RAND Corporation. Available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/
projects/terrorism-incidents/about.html; !!“Global Terrorism Database,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START). Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/; !!!See Table 2.
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Table 2 builds on recent efforts to create a database on kidnappings in Spain, and on ear-
lier data collection in Argentina.30 In order to compile the data on Germany, Italy, Uruguay,
and Ireland, I surveyed key texts on terrorism in those countries. Table 2 includes every
instance of a kidnapping whose details (date, victim, authorship) are corroborated by three
independent sources. Incidents mentioned and described by less than three sources were not
included.31
The most signiﬁcant contrast in Table 2 is that between Ireland and Spain, two countries
where ethnic terrorist organizations viewed themselves as existing in a neo-colonial situation
and being exploited by the Madrid central government and by London. In addition, Irish
and Spanish organizations occasionally exchanged know-how. According to Francisco Llera
and Rafael Leonisio, ETA resorted to kidnappings fairly consistently after 1970. Roughly 51
percent of all kidnappings were for proﬁt: the family was asked for a ransom, or the abductee
was a bank manager or chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer who was then forced to open a bank or com-
pany safe and provide ETA with its contents. One of ETA’s consistent sources of funding
was the “revolutionary tax,” the extortion of funds from businesses in the Basque Country.
Table 2. Kidnappings in selected countries, 1968–1990.
Year Uruguay Argentina Italy Germany Spain Ireland Total
1968 1 1
1969 1 1
1970 6 13 1 2 22
1971 7 27 34
1972 16 2 1 19
1973 63 3 1 1 68
1974 60 3 2 65
1975 35 4 1 1 41
1976 22 2 4 28
1977 3 2 3 1 9
1978 2 8 10
1979 13 13
1980 1 18 19
1981 5 9 1 15
1982 1 8 9
1983 6 2 8
1984 1 1
1985 3 3





Total 15 239 26 4 81 7 372
Sources. Stefan Aust, The Baader-Meinhof Group. The Inside Story of a Phenomenon (London: The Bodley Head, 1987); Carol
Edler Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings. A Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973);
Jillian Becker, Hitler’s Children. The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang (London: Michael Joseph, 1977); Pablo Brum,
The Robin Hood Guerrillas. The Epic Story of Uruguay’s Tupamaros (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Publishers, 2014); Richard
Clutterbuck, Kidnap & Ransom: The Response (London: Faber and Faber, 1978); John C. Grifﬁths, Hostage. The History, Facts &
Reasoning Behind Hostage Taking (London: Carlton Publishing Group, 2003); Paul Howard, Hostage. Notorious Irish Kidnap-
pings (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2004); Alison Jamieson, The Heart Attacked. Terrorism and Conﬂict in the the Italian State (London
and New York: Marion Boyars, 1989); Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968–1974
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1975); Francisco J. Llera and Rafael Leonisio, “Los Secuestros de ETA y sus Organi-
zaciones Aﬁnes, 1970–1997: Una Base de Datos,” Revista Espa~nola de Ciencia Pol!ıtica 37 (2015): 141–160; Robert C. Meade,
Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Mar!ıa Jos!e Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol.
Armed Struggle, 1969–1979 (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1995); Michael Newton, The Encyclopedia of
Kidnappings (New York: Facts on File, 2002); Vittorfranco S. Pisano, The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary
Italy (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).
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Businessmen would receive a letter from the group demanding a ﬁxed monthly sum, but
some refused to pay. An occasional kidnapping served to warn those potential rebels of the
cost of refusing to pay the “revolutionary tax.” Another 20 percent of kidnappings were
meant to weigh in on labor conﬂicts. These tended to be “express kidnappings” where the
victim, usually a management representative, was held only for a day. Once the management
acquiesced to labor demands, the abductee was freed. A third major cause of kidnappings
(17 percent) was the desire to exert political pressure; for example, by abducting a prison
ofﬁcial to demand better conditions for ETA prisoners.32
ETA’s willingness to resort to kidnappings for a variety of motives may have been deter-
mined by the success of its early endeavours. The ﬁrst abductee was Jos!e !Angel Aguirre, a
bank manager held overnight so that he could open the bank safe early the next morning.
That operation netted four million pesetas. Two months later, ETA kidnapped Eugene Biehl,
honorary West German consul in San Sebasti!an, with the goal of pressuring Franco into
clemency for the Basque terrorists on trial at Burgos. Although the government never
acknowledged it, a deal was made. ETA released Biehl on Christmas Day, and Franco used
the holiday period to appear magnanimous and commute all death sentences. The case
attracted massive press attention all over Europe.33 One year later, ETA kidnapped Lorenzo
Zabala, manager of a factory immersed in a labor conﬂict. He was released after four days,
once the factory acquiesced to labor demands and freed all imprisoned shop ﬂoor activists.34
ETA only suffered setbacks in 1976 and 1977, when in the course of kidnappings negotiations
broke down, the families did not pay a ransom, and the victims, businessmen !Angel Berazadi
and Javier de Ybarra, were assassinated. 35 The group then switched focus and concentrated
on “express kidnappings” for economic gain, and only undertook more kidnappings when it
felt the need to apply political pressure. In 1979, for example, ETA kidnapped conservative
politician Javier Rup!erez and obtained better prison conditions for group members.36
While both wings of ETA (ETA politico-military and ETA military) carried out 81 kid-
nappings, Irish terrorists carried out seven. During the 1973 Christmas season, an IRA unit
kidnapped Thomas Niedermayer, manager of the Grundig plant and also West German con-
sul in Belfast. The kidnappers opened negotiations with Grundig possibly to demand pay-
ment of a ransom, although the real motive seems to have been to pressure the British
government into stopping the forced feeding of Marian and Dolours Price, two IRA women
on a hunger strike in British jails. Niedermayer attempted to escape and in the attempt to
control him, he was suffocated. This was a major embarrassment for the IRA, which buried
Niedermayer in secret.37 However, in June 1974 another unit kidnapped Lord and Lady
Donoughmore, British residents in the Irish Republic, once again in support of the Price sis-
ters. The sisters came off their hunger strike, not because of the kidnapping but thanks to
back-channel negotiations by a moderate Catholic politician, and the Donoughmores were
released unharmed.38 A year later, some members of this gang kidnapped Dutch industrialist
Tiede Herrema in the Irish Republic and demanded the release of three IRA volunteers from
jail. The Irish government refused to negotiate and also devoted signiﬁcant police resources
to ﬁnding the gang. After a two-week siege, the kidnappers surrendered. Herrema was
unharmed.39 The last four kidnappings had a purely economic motive. In 1981 and 1983,
the IRA kidnapped businessmen Ben Dunne and Don Tidey, both in the Republic. Ransoms
were demanded and paid for both, although the government tried to prevent it.40 Also in
1983, the IRA kidnapped the racehorse Shergar. It became uncontrollable in captivity and
had to be shot well before negotiations could lead to ransom payment—another major
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embarrassment for the IRA.41 Finally, in 1987 the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
kidnapped dentist John O’Grady but failed to obtain a ransom, even after severing and mail-
ing two of O’Grady’s ﬁngers.42
The contrast between Spanish and Irish terrorists’ kidnapping record is stark. Attempting
to explain why the latter had not and would not show much interest in kidnappings, “North-
ern Ireland Future Terrorist Trends” argued the terrorists recognized that the targets were
well guarded and the British and Irish governments would not give in to blackmail.43 The
government of the Irish Republic (where most of the kidnappings took place) had taken an
increasingly harder line. By the time Dunne and Shergar were kidnapped, the taoiseach
(prime minister), Garret FitzGerald, involved the upper echelons of the Irish police service
to prevent any ransom being paid.44 The Irish government had already “made a death
pact”45 in the autumn of 1973— faced with the epidemic of kidnappings all over the world,
the cabinet decided that they would never bow to demands, even if their own families were
affected. The IRA’s own analysis was also fairly pragmatic:
The biggest issue we had with kidnappings is that they paralyse the whole country. They put all
kinds of things at risk—arms dumps, planned operations, safe houses. You’ve got guys on the
run who are put at serious risk of capture because all of a sudden there’s this heightened state of
security. There’s roadblocks, searches. It makes it impossible to operate. And it gives the police
a perfect excuse to round republicans up.46
Uruguay’s Tupamaros took a different view. Among sociorevolutionary terrorists, the
Tupamaros popularized a tactic that had originated with the Guatemalans and Brazilians,
and were in turn imitated by Argentine, Italian, and German groups, among others. As the
Tupamaros explained in the book-length analysis of their best operations,
The most notorious kidnappings are but modest evidence of the inﬁnite possibilities offered by a
people’s prison where one can detain for indeterminate time: regime personalities, minions of
repression, foreign personages, and men who are key to the survival of the regime. With those
men in the hands of the guerrillas, we can ensure the physical well-being of the imprisoned
comrades. … Kidnappings and people’s jail can also be used, for example, against managers
who refuse to budge during workers’ disputes. Revolutionary prisons … have become in prac-
tice one of the most efﬁcacious ways of upsetting the regime’s plans.47
Consistent with this analysis, the Tupamaros conducted three kidnappings in 1968–70 in
support of labor struggles, during which they conveyed an aura of invincibility, obtained
some cash, and managed to get their manifestos widely published in the press. Subsequently
they concocted Plan Satan, involving a number of high-proﬁle kidnappings of foreigners
over two years in order to exchange them for political prisoners. David Ronfeldt calls this
“the most deliberate kidnapping campaign ever undertaken.”48 Polls showed that a third of
the public thought these kidnappings were legitimate.49 However, two of the abductees
escaped, and the government refused to negotiate so that Daniel Mitrione, an American
advisor to the Uruguayan police, could be released. After holding an organization-wide vote
on Mitrione’s fate, the Tupamaros killed him. This brought about signiﬁcant disagreements
among the group’s leadership.50 The Mitrione kidnapping also facilitated repression: “The
President described the situation as ‘the greatest attack this country’s political institutions
have faced in this century,’”51 and there was massive deployment of security force personnel
to try and ﬁnd him.
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In 1970–1971 the Tupamaros conducted a second wave of kidnappings. Except for British
ambassador Geoffrey Jackson, the victims were all Uruguayans. The terrorists’ objectives
were mixed. In some cases, the Tupamaros demanded and obtained ransoms. State prosecu-
tor Guido Berro was kidnapped so that he could be interrogated about his handling of Tupa-
maro legal cases. He was released unharmed and the Tupamaros published a transcript of his
interrogation. In some cases including that of Jackson, who spent nine months in captivity,
the motives were unclear.52 In any event, thanks to the betrayal of two police informers
within the Tupamaros, the relentless police and military operations in the wake of the
Mitrione and Jackson kidnappings, and possibly the internal disagreements over the murder
of Mitrione, the group was “no longer a viable ﬁghting force” by late 1972.53
In Argentina, the practice of kidnappings may have originated partly in admiration for
the Tupamaros. In their early years, when Argentine terrorists wanted to praise an operation
for its precision and economy of effort, they called it “a very pando operation,”54 turning
into an adjective the name of the town the Tupamaros brieﬂy occupied in 1969. But although
the Uruguayans popularized the tactic of kidnappings, as Table 2 indicates the Argentines
took it much further. Ransom was by far the most important motive—48 percent of all kid-
nappings in Argentina led to ransom payments.55 Six different terrorist groups that eventu-
ally merged into two very large ones, the Peronist Montoneros and the Marxist People’s
Revolutionary Army (ERP), all engaged in kidnappings. Those abducted for ransom were
executives in multinational corporations such as Exxon or Coca Cola, or in large Argentine
businesses. The sums demanded were increasingly larger, and when one lists dates and ran-
som payments as reported in the press, the entrepreneurial quality of the terrorists becomes
clear. To this day, and according to the Guinness Book of Records, the 61.5 million dollar ran-
som paid for brothers Juan and Jorge Born in 1975 remains the highest ever paid for a politi-
cal kidnapping. A second motive behind kidnappings (16 percent of total) was that of
obtaining concessions or exposing certain conditions in businesses, schools, or other institu-
tions. In 1973, for example, the terrorists kidnapped Hugo D’Aquila, a psychiatrist working
at Devoto prison, in order to expose prison conditions. D’Aquila was eventually released,
but the terrorists then published the transcript of his interrogation in book form.56
When ofﬁcers in the armed or security forces and politicians were abducted, the objective
was to make a statement or a show of operational precision. This goal accounts for 13 percent
of kidnappings in Argentina over a nine-year period. Interestingly, this objective became para-
mount after 1976 and once the “Dirty War,” the campaign of illegal repression leading to
thousands of “disappearances,” was launched. Half of all kidnappings after 1976, while the
“Dirty War was wiping out the terrorists,” were against the most heavily guarded set of poten-
tial victims.57 It is possible that the success of their ﬁrst abduction loomed large. In 1970, the
Montoneros ofﬁcially launched their campaign of violence by kidnapping a former president,
retired General Pedro Aramburu, and putting him on “people’s trial.” Aramburu was accused
of leading the coup that deposed Juan Per!on in 1955 and of repressing the Peronist masses.
He was sentenced to death after his “trial” and executed. The Aramburu kidnapping turned
the Montoneros into heroes in certain circles and acted as a signiﬁcant recruitment tool. In
fact, most Montoneros considered the Aramburu operation ultimately responsible for their
organization’s ability to attract thousands of followers.58
Admiration for the Tupamaros, and possibly a desire to emulate their actions, extended
well beyond Argentina. According to Alison Jamieson, Latin America occupied “a position
of honour in Italian revolutionary mythology.”59 The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla
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was published in Italy in 1970 to wide acclaim, and there was great admiration among Italian
revolutionaries for the kidnapping of British Honorary Consul Stanley Sylvester in Argen-
tina in 1971.60 More importantly, the Red Brigades had studied the operations by the Tupa-
maros and concluded that kidnapping was an invaluable tactic, given that it had
propaganda, political, and ﬁnancial value.61 Vittorfranco Pisano describes 26 kidnappings
by different sociorevolutionary terrorist organizations in Italy, which he groups into clus-
ters.62 The ﬁrst cluster (1972–74) evolved around labor conditions. Kidnappings were of
short duration and the victims were forced to make symbolic gestures such as having their
picture taken with a Red Brigades banner. Slowly, the terrorists introduced the concept of
“people’s trial” where the victim would be interrogated about working conditions at his fac-
tory. The last kidnapping of this cluster had a political motive. The victim was Mario Sossi,
assistant prosecutor in Genoa. He was held for 35 days and subjected to trial. The Red Bri-
gades attempted to exchange Sossi for their imprisoned comrades. The state initially agreed,
but the decision was reversed in the courts on appeal. The brigattisti released Sossi
unharmed, and also released a record of his “trial” for propaganda purposes.63
The second cluster (1975–77) was the work of the second-generation terrorists, since the
founder generation was by then in jail. The objective here was monetary gain. During this
second cluster, two smaller organizations, the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) and the
Communist Combatant Units (CCC) joined the Red Brigades and conducted a total of four
kidnappings. A third and eminently political cluster (1978–80) was dominated by the kid-
napping and subsequent murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, although it included
the abduction of Supreme Court Justice Giovanni d’Urso. Both men were subjected to “peo-
ple’s trial.” D’Urso was released after the terrorists obtained signiﬁcant concessions in prison
conditions.64 A ﬁnal cluster in 1981, which took place against the backdrop of renewed
counterterrorist efforts in the wake of Moro’s death, involved several concurrent kidnap-
pings. There was no unifying theme—some kidnappings were designed to intervene in labor
disputes, one had a proﬁt motive, and one (U.S. Army General James Dozier) was political.65
There is evidence that West German terrorists also greatly admired the Tupamaros. The
Extra-Parliamentary Opposition, from which both terrorist organizations in Germany
emerged, called itself “West Berlin Tupamaros.” In addition, as early as December 1970, the
Baader-Meinhof group (the alternative and more popular name given to the RAF) consid-
ered kidnapping a publisher or a politician in order to get better prison conditions for their
comrades. The group entertained the idea of kidnappings again in late 1971.66 However, it
would not be until 1975, by which time the founding generation was in jail, that German ter-
rorists kidnapped conservative politician Peter Lorenz and asked for the release of impris-
oned comrades. Once the comrades were ﬂown to the Middle East, the group released
Lorenz unharmed.67 This was unquestionably a victory for the terrorists, but a pyrrhic one,
because it cost the left votes at the next election, and the left blamed the terrorists.68
German terrorists attempted another kidnapping in July 1977, in order to demand the
release of comrades once again. The victim, chairman of Dresdner Bank Jurgen Ponto,
resisted and was killed on the spot.69 Three months later, they kidnapped Hans-Martin
Schleyer, president of the German Industry Association in Cologne, demanding the release of
eleven comrades from jail. This venture ended in a colossal failure. In support of this demand,
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a Lufthansa plane and diverted it to
Mogadishu. German commandos stormed the plane and killed the terrorists. The imprisoned
terrorist leaders, on whose behalf the whole operation was staged, then committed suicide in
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Stammheim prison, and the kidnappers then murdered Schleyer.70 Interestingly, ten days
after they killed Schleyer, German terrorists kidnapped a Dutch millionaire in Amsterdam
and extracted four million dollars—an operation almost certainly planned before the debacle
at Mogadishu. However, they never attempted a kidnapping again.71
Analysis and Conclusion
What can we conclude about the resort to kidnappings across the six cases considered? It is
clear that ideology did not play a part in the decision to engage in the tactic in a systematic
way. Basque and Irish terrorists shared a similar understanding of the opponent and the
nature of their struggle, but while ETA factions undertook kidnappings consistently, the
IRA and INLA did so infrequently. The four sociorevolutionary cases discussed above also
shared an ideology, but in spite of a deep admiration for the Tupamaros, German terrorists
had little interest in copying their tactics. It is also clear that the epidemic of kidnappings
did not originate in any strategic analysis by the groups. Except for the Argentine case, where
kidnappings were consistently undertaken as a major source of terrorist funding, it is impos-
sible to discern clear goals behind the resort to the tactic. When employed, the tactic of kid-
nappings was used in a multiplicity of contexts and to serve purposes that were not always
clear. However, Italians and Argentines were so attached to kidnappings that they insisted
on conducting them even in the face of increased counterterrorist action. At that stage, com-
mon sense would have dictated a change away from operations of such complexity, which
require greater organizational resources and expose the terrorist group unnecessarily.
There are three additional factors that may explain some but by no means all of the vari-
ability among the cases. Some scholars argue that the security environment in which the ter-
rorists operate will inﬂuence the types of operations they undertake.72 This may help explain
the difference between Italian and German terrorists when it comes to kidnappings. The Ital-
ians enjoyed something of a legal safe haven, because they initially faced an opponent (the
police, gendarmerie, and judiciary) that was not up to the task, whereas the German police
and intelligence services, whatever the weaknesses displayed at the Munich Olympics in
1972 or during the Lorenz kidnapping in 1975, eventually recovered. However, the Argen-
tine and Uruguayan police and military made up in brutality what they lacked in expertise,
and in spite of this very hostile security environment, in both countries the kidnapping
industry ﬂourished. It should also be pointed out that the Garda S!ıoch!ana, the Republic of
Ireland police, was much more sympathetic to Irish terrorism than the Spanish National
Police could ever be toward ETA. The security environment was not necessarily more con-
ducive to kidnappings in Spain.
Others have explained terrorist preferences through a discussion of group capabilities and
resources or intergroup rivalry.73 Organizational resources matter when it comes to explain-
ing organizational outputs. Italian terrorist organizations were always much larger that their
German counterparts, and therefore better positioned to conduct kidnappings, which are
labor intensive operations requiring several surveillance teams prior to the abduction, a sig-
niﬁcant contingent of operatives during the abduction, and also different teams of jailers if
the victim is to spend days or weeks in different safe houses. Similar arguments could be
made when one compares Uruguay and Argentina. The ERP and Montoneros were much
larger and wealthier than the Tupamaros so the Argentines were better positioned to con-
duct such complex operations.
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However, terrorist organizations do not necessarily adjust their output to their resources.
The Tupamaros launched an ambitious kidnapping campaign in 1968 when their organiza-
tion had approximately ﬁfty members, and the Red Brigades did likewise with only ﬁfteen
adherents.74 The Montoneros kidnapped former President Aramburu, when the organiza-
tion was in its infancy and had approximately twenty recruits. Almost every member of the
founding group was involved, and in spite of the success of the operation, the group almost
perished in the repression that followed. In fact, if terrorist resources always determined ter-
rorist output, the IRA should have conducted signiﬁcantly more kidnappings than it did.
The IRA was as strapped for cash as ETA; at least until Muammar Gaddaﬁ showered his
generosity on them in the mid-1980s. But the IRA, a group committed to innovation in a
number of areas, showed little interest in perfecting the art of abduction.
Organizational competition for adherents did not seem to play a signiﬁcant role either.
In Spain, ETA split into a politico-military and a military wing in 1974. The two factions
were in competition until 1981, when the ETA politico-military renounced violence. How-
ever, between 1968 and 1980, ETA politico-military was the only faction engaged in kid-
nappings. In Uruguay, Italy, Ireland, and Germany, the terrorist landscape involved one
dominant group (Tupamaros, Red Brigades, IRA, Baader-Meinhof, respectively) but also
smaller organizations that did not present a serious challenge. Finally, organizational
dynamics in Argentina led not to the usual splintering typical of terrorism, but to mergers
and fusions. The kidnapping epidemic started when there were six groups in competition,
but continued unabated after only two groups were left. These groups did not compete for
the same supporters—Montoneros was Peronist, subscribed to a nationalist agenda, and
aimed to recruit among the working classes, while ERP was Marxist and recruited in uni-
versity circles.
Although the security environment and the organizational resources of the terrorist
groups may have contributed to the decisions, the argument presented here was that the tac-
tic of kidnapping spread within and across countries because terrorists made a pragmatic
evaluation of the reaction by governments and the public and consequently of the costs or
beneﬁts of a particular course of action. Once the terrorists perceived the tactic to be efﬁca-
cious, they persisted in it. ETA understood early on that a kidnapping could achieve some-
thing as momentous as the reversal of a judicial verdict in a historic trial. In addition, it
became clear to the group that kidnappings were a major source of funding, and by interven-
ing in labor disputes through kidnappings ETA could also win popular support. The Argen-
tines, who had reversed ﬁfteen years of their country’s history with the kidnapping of
Aramburu, moved quickly to amass well over one hundred million dollars through abduc-
tions. In addition, the Argentines knew that national and international press coverage
describing them as modern day Robin Hoods made evident the total incompetence of the
forces of law and order. The Italians managed to publicize prison conditions, inﬂuence the
outcome of labor disputes, and obtain funds. The killing of Moro also led to signiﬁcant
recruitment for the Red Brigades.75 Finally, Plan Satan brought to the Tupamaros signiﬁcant
popular support, and the ability to embarrass the regime in the international arena; at least
while the security forces were in disarray.
The Irish and Germans had no such sense of achievement. The Niedermayer kidnapping
ended up in embarrassment. The Donoughmore abduction proved unnecessary, as Marian
and Dolours Price came off their hunger strike, and with the demise of the racehorse, the
IRA looked like brutes. Once the Irish government started a policy of trying to prevent the
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families from paying ransom, the IRA cut their losses. The German experience was equally
ambivalent. The Lorenz incident ended in a draw—the terrorists freed their comrades and
lost the election. The Ponto and Schleyer kidnappings were abject failures, resulting in the
deaths of those comrades they were seeking to liberate.
In other words, the terrorists’ decision to engage (or not) in a campaign of kidnappings
could be described as “the outcome of a learning process.”76 Such learning could occur in a
number of contexts. Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of training camps.77
We know that some in the ﬁrst generation of Tupamaros, Montoneros, and ERP trained in
Cuba, although the short trips seemed something of an exercise in public relations. We also
know that German terrorists trained brieﬂy with the Palestinians in Jordan, although the
Germans thought their hosts were too focused on rural guerrilla tactics. Stefan Aust, who
knew all the terrorists well, described the experience as “revolutionary tourism” to highlight
how trivial the actual training was. The Red Brigades turned down an offer of training at Pal-
estinian camps, partly due to the danger of exposure that travel would present, but also
because the Italians thought they were learning valuable lessons at home from their own
experience.78
Transfers of terrorists from one unit to another and informal meetings could also lead to
learning. At least three Argentinians joined the Tupamaros before returning home to join
Montoneros and ERP.79 We also know that ERP leaders met Tupamaros and members of
other Latin American groups in Havana and held discussions there, that the Red Brigades
met regularly with groups in Germany and with the Palestinians, and that ETA and the IRA
had frequent contacts and exchanged know-how, especially in the area of bombmaking.80
Books, pamphlets, and other documents can be conducive to learning. The Tupamaros’s
Actas Tupamaras and Marighella’sMinimanual have already been mentioned as the “practi-
cal text book for the emerging militant organisations.”81 There were also 1970s versions of
“Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom,” the Inspire article that caused such a stir in
Summer 2010.82 In addition, we should not underestimate the impact of popular culture.
Just as several Montoneros told me that “we all saw The Battle of Algiers ﬁve or six times,” it
is conceivable that State of Siege, Costa-Gavras’s 1972 ﬁlm on the Mitrione kidnapping,
served to publicize the tactic through its sympathetic portrait of the Tupamaros.83
Two types of learning appear to have inﬂuenced the adoption of kidnappings: learning by
observing others, and learning by doing. We know that Mario Santucho, leader of the ERP,
was very impressed by and knowledgeable about the kidnapping of the United States
ambassador to Brazil in 1969. We also know that the Red Brigades developed the idea of kid-
napping to intervene in factory struggles after studying the Sylvester kidnapping in Argen-
tina; and that they studied various Tupamaro kidnappings and the Schleyer kidnapping
before concluding that the most effective way to seize Moro was during transit to his ofﬁce.84
Jon Elster has argued that once a group succeeds at kidnapping for ransom, it is more likely
to want to engage in kidnapping for political concessions, or vice versa, suggesting that skills
may inﬂuence decisions.85 Once the Red Brigades put together the team that eventually kid-
napped Aldo Moro, they kept the team together for subsequent kidnappings. The Monto-
neros, who had entrusted the Born kidnapping—a large operation involving forty people,
months of practice, and several dry runs—to their North Column, increasingly left kidnap-
pings in the hands of the same team.86
Arguments presented here for six organizations active during the Cold War period are
consistent with analyses of hostage-taking in Iraq since 2003. According to James Tyner, the
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taking of hostages in Iraq could not be explained by ideology, given the bizarre selection of
hostages, or by strategic analysis, since governments have been inconsistent, and media cov-
erage has not been extensive. Rather, hostage-taking is designed for short-term and prag-
matic gains.87 However, even though James Forest has argued that the study of terrorist
decision making on kidnappings “can contribute to our understanding of terrorism in gen-
eral,”88 the arguments presented here may not necessarily apply to other terrorist tactics.
Kidnapping is labor intensive and complex. For this reason, it generally represents a small
share of the total volume of violence by any terrorist organization. By contrast, bombings
involve little risk and require few resources, which is why half of all terrorist attacks have his-
torically involved bombs.
However, precisely because kidnappings are rare occurrences and require a signiﬁcant
commitment of resources, case studies such as the present one, incorporating journalistic
accounts, terrorist memoirs as well as secondary sources, can do much to uncover decision-
making processes within clandestine groups. There are a number of further avenues for
research. If the decision to kidnap or not to kidnap comes through a pragmatic analysis of
the efﬁcacy of the tactic in a given context, we can assume that the terrorist group learns
from its environment by incorporating the preferences and choices of different group lead-
ers. We do not know how those preferences are aggregated. We also know that the main les-
son the Montoneros drew from the Aramburu kidnapping was that a fuite en avant was the
right option. “We will come out of this by ﬁghting,” is how that lesson was explained.89 The
Montoneros’s ability to survive the heavy repression that followed Aramburu’s kidnapping
in 1970 became the group’s foundational myth. They attempted to repeat that feat in 1976,
without recognizing that it was a suicidal response, given the nature of the new military
regime. This suggests that there are psychological inﬂuences at play in the tactical decision-
making process, an area where more work could be done. Finally, we know from the IRA
experience that kidnapping was attractive to the members in one particular geographic area,
South Armagh. More work could be done to account for regional differences in the tactical
options chosen by a given group.
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